But penance seems to be a theological virtue , since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God , to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice. Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jeremiah : "Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation. Further, there are two species of justice , as stated in Ethic.
Objection 4. Further, a gloss on Luke , "Blessed are ye that weep now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice. I answer that, As stated above Article 1, Reply to Objection 2 penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done since charity would suffice for that , but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God , and purposes to amend.
Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against.
Each of these belongs to the matter of justice , because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue , is a part of justice. It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher Ethic. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just , because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom.
But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband.
It is this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Psalm : "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters. As stated in Ethic. Hence the matter of penance is not God , but human acts , whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue , because God is not its matter or object.
The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man , as the Philosopher states Ethic. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance.
As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice , or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge.
Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice. Reply to Objection 4. Although penance is directly a species of justice , yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues ; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God , it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues , the object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's Passion , whereby we are cleansed of our sins , hope for pardon, and hatred of vice , which pertains to charity.
Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue , it has a share of prudence , which directs all the moral virtues : but from the very nature of justice , it has not only something belonging to justice , but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude , inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance , and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice.
Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance , and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude. Article 4. Whether the will is properly the subject of penance?
It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty. Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance.
Therefore it seems that penance is in the irascible part. Further, the past is the proper object of the memory , according to the Philosopher De Memoria i. Now penance regards the past, as stated above 1, ad 2, ad 3.
Therefore penance is subjected in the memory. Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every power of the soul , and not only in the will. On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Psalm : "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit. I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a passion , and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue , and thus, as stated above Article 3 , it is a species of justice.
Now justice , as stated in I-II , is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue , is subjected in the will , and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against God.
This argument considers penance as a passion. To desire vengeance on another, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite , but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will. Reply to Objection 1: The very fact of falling away from the love of God by sin, does not work unto the good of all those who love God, which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or who rise and fall yet again; but only to the good of "such as according to His purpose are called to be saints," viz.
Consequently good comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part of grace itself, because the greater the grace, the more abiding it is, but on the part of man, who, the more careful and humble he is, abides the more steadfastly in grace.
Hence the same gloss adds that "their fall conduces to their good, because they rise more humble and more enlightened. Reply to Objection 3: This comparison of the two graces to the evening and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the darkness of night follows after the evening light, and the light of day after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater or lesser quantity. Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man's sins.
Nor is it true of all, that the more their sins abound, the more abundant grace they receive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of grace, because to him who sins more a more "gratuitous" favor is vouchsafed by his pardon; although sometimes those whose sins abound, abound also in sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue, as was the case with Magdalen.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must be replied that in one and the same man proficient grace is greater than incipient grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of proficiency: thus Gregory says Dial. Objection 1: It would seem that man is not restored by Penance to his former dignity: because a gloss on Amos , "The virgin of Israel is cast down," observes: "It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not the same glory as if it had never strayed.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says: "Whoever fail to preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls; for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree.
Objection 3: Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin, for it is written Ezech. In respect of God he again loses a twofold dignity. The other is his secondary dignity, viz. Nevertheless he recovers something greater sometimes; because as Gregory says Hom. This he is debarred from recovering: first, because he fails to repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop Masso, and as we read in the Distinction quoted above Objection [3] : "The canons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy confession of them.
On the other hand, those who do not mend their corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise their order, nor received to the grace of communion. In like manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty of homicide, whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in self-defense. Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same Distinction Objection [3] : "Those who have been publicly convicted or caught in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of such like crimes, according to the prescription of the sacred canons must be deprived of the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to God's people that such persons should be placed over them.
But those who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest, may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the assurance of God's merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds.
Reply to Objection 2: In these words Jerome does not say that it is impossible, but that it is difficult, for man to recover his former dignity after having sinned, because this is allowed to none but those who repent perfectly, as stated above. To those canonical statutes, which seem to forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface Ep. Nevertheless we must not deem the care of later teachers excessive, who without endangering a man's salvation, exacted more from his humility, having, in my opinion, found by experience, that some assumed a pretended repentance through hankering after honors and power.
For Peter, after his denial, was made shepherd of Christ's sheep, as appears from Jn. Objection 1: It would seem that virtuous deeds done in charity cannot be deadened. For that which is not cannot be changed. But to be deadened is to be changed from life to death. Since therefore virtuous deeds, after being done, are no more, it seems that they cannot afterwards be deadened. Objection 2: Further, by virtuous deeds done in charity, man merits eternal life. But to take away the reward from one who has merited it is an injustice, which cannot be ascribed to God.
Therefore it is not possible for virtuous deeds done in charity to be deadened by a subsequent sin. Objection 3: Further, the strong is not corrupted by the weak. Now works of charity are stronger than any sins, because, as it is written Prov. McGrath Institute for Church Life. Living and Handing on the Faith The McGrath Institute Blog helps Catholics live and hand on their faith in Jesus Christ, especially in the family, home and parish, and cultivates and inspires everyday leaders to live out the fullness and richness of their faith in the simple, little ways that make up Church life.
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