The latter prompted the US, UK and France to conduct air strikes that they said targeted facilities associated with the "Syrian regime's chemical weapons programme". Mr Assad and the Russian military denied committing war crimes, and said the incidents in Khan Sheikhoun and Douma were "staged" by the opposition and their Western backers.
After recapturing the Eastern Ghouta, pro-government forces set their sights on the last three opposition bastions. They retook an enclave north of Homs in May and regained full control of Deraa province two months later. They then declared their intention to "liberate" Idlib province. The UN warned there would be a "bloodbath" if the government launched an all-out assault on an area home to about three million civilians, half of them displaced from other parts of Syria.
Mr Assad was not deterred, but the offensive was halted that September by an agreement between Russia and Turkey, which called for a "demilitarised buffer zone" along the front line and the withdrawal from it of the jihadist fighters that dominate Idlib.
However, the deal was never fully implemented, and fighting on the ground and air strikes continued. In late , Mr Assad's forces resumed their offensive. Hundreds of people were killed and almost a million fled their homes before Turkey and Russia agreed another ceasefire in March The president was then forced to turn his attention to dealing with an economic crisis that triggered angry protests in territory under his control for the first time since the start of the uprising.
Mr Assad has weathered the war but the cost of the conflict will mark Syria for years, if not decades, to come. Image source, AFP. Bashar al-Assad says he is fighting foreign-backed terrorists in Syria. An unplanned president. The Assad family has ruled Syria for more than four decades.
Flirtation with reform. Hardline diplomacy. Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon after being blamed for the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Image source, Reuters. Mr Assad initially blamed a small number of troublemakers and saboteurs for the unrest. Homs, like many Syrian cities and towns, has been devastated by the fighting. Chemical weapons. UN chemical weapons experts did not ascribe blame for the Sarin attack on the Ghouta. Mr Assad's re-election in was dismissed by his opponents as a farce.
Russian intervention. Russian air strikes were decisive in the battle for eastern Aleppo in Russia says 63, of its military personnel have seen combat in Syria since Traditionally, the regime's staunchest supporters were the Alawites, the ethnic group of the ruling family.
Since the beginning of the conflict, Bashar al-Assad has consistently painted himself as a defender against domestic "terrorists", a term which the Syrian regime applies to essentially all their opponents in the conflict. This theme became even more prevalent with the rise of ISIS, as al-Assad has sought to establish himself as a "protector" of the Syrian people against the Islamic State. Another important factor in the survival of the Syrian regime has been the support of foreign patrons. The financial, military, and political support of the Russian and Iranian governments are a major reason that al-Assad's government has been able to maintain its hold on power.
Al-Assad, his government, and his Russian benefactors has been accused of committing war crimes in Syria. See the tab titled " Human Rights and Refugees " for more information and resources on these issues. Russia Today's Interview with al-Assad Dec.
It looks like you're using Internet Explorer 11 or older. This website works best with modern browsers such as the latest versions of Chrome, Firefox, Safari, and Edge. Many restaurants and bars sell alcohol, not only in the Christian areas. It is not uncommon to see long manes of hair, skintight T-shirts and leggings, audaciously low necklines, and provocative make-up on university campuses in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, or Lathakia, as well as in the streets and shopping quarters.
The contrasts in Syrian society are sharpening. Muslims, Christians, and the few remaining Jews live peacefully door to door in the old quarters of Damascus, instead of dwelling in more or less homogeneous ghettos. In other countries in the region such as Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and even in the politically more open Lebanon, religious communities have withdrawn into separate shells, cut themselves off, and become encrusted.
They have entered into a competition of identity whose own dialectic momentum has created the compulsion for people to assign themselves more and more clearly along religious or ethnic cleavages. Loudspeakers that deliver the muezzin's prayers from mosques have been restricted by law to one mosque per district, so that the noise does not upset Christians or more secular Muslims. The Civil Code of , which to a large extent still applies today, was modeled on the secular French code.
Women are allowed to file for divorce, which is far from the customary convention, as debates in Egypt have shown. They enjoy equality with men in the eyes of the law and receive equal pay for equal work, which is not always the case even in some Western countries. There is a large number of Syrian women in middle-management positions, and women account for more than half of the students in the universities. Since , the military is no longer an exclusively male domain, and since , boys and girls have been taught in common classrooms.
Catholics, for example, have reacted promptly and granted men and women equal share. Unlike in Iraq, political cleavages do not run along religious lines yet. An old mosaic manufacturer in the Old City of Damascus replied when he was asked whether he was not happy that Iraqi refugees increased the number of Christians in Syria: "I don't care if they are Christians or not. Here, we Damascene people trust each other, Christian, Muslim, Jew, or whoever. We know each other and each other's families, we live together, and we do fair business with each other.
The Iraqis are different. I don't trust them. Iraqis enjoy free health care and education as Syrian citizens. With this peaceful absorption of religious and ethnic minorities in times of scarce means, Syria has delivered a model to the Middle East. This also showed when Syria hosted some , Lebanese refugees, most of them Shi'a, with extraordinary helpfulness. Even human rights organizations have acknowledged this endeavor, although they usually have many good reasons to condemn Syria's human rights violations when it comes to gagging dissenters.
In this context, two aspects must be put forward that qualify the above remarks. First, apart from religious freedom, Syria still has an ethnic problem. The regime has remained reluctant to grant citizenship to about , members of its Kurdish population that mostly live in the northern provinces bordering with Turkey and Iraq. Many Kurds have assimilated and are no champions of separatism like many of their fellows in today's Iraq.
However, this situation could change when rising pan-Arab rhetoric and regime stubbornness clashes with increased Kurdish activism from across the border. The second problem with regard to Islamism and secularism is an escalating paradox: While Syria has been trying to fight Islamism at home, it has allied itself with Islamist forces abroad, i. This contradiction creates tensions also within Syria. In its present state of weakness, the regime in Damascus cannot afford a second front at home.
As a result, Islamists have an increased leeway of action and are eroding Syrian secular society. Among the constructive elements that Syria contributes to the region one has to mention its relative socio-economic balance thanks to its rest-socialism with free public services and regulated prices of basic goods. Slums and visible poverty like in Egypt, for example, do not exist in Syria.
This however, is may change with increased strains through economic reforms, rising real estate prices, and the influx of Iraqi refugees who are in need of quick housing solutions. Syria has a strong and reasonably educated middle class. Among them are many moderate Sunni merchants who are more interested in business than in Islamist rhetoric.
This is a healthy back bone for a possible pluralist or even democratic development. Another positive aspect that is even conceded by members of the opposition is law and order in Syria. The country is a police state, and according to one estimate there is one secret service member for every Syrians over the age of fifteen.
The reasons are not only found in the strong state machinery, but also the still largely intact traditions and a strict code of values despite the growing challenge through social change. The looting and excesses of violence in post-war Iraq have made even more evident its contrast to the tranquility in Syria.
The situation is likewise worse in Lebanon due to its greater social and sectarian divisions. Finally, the tradition of Syrian pragmatism is an asset in the region. Damascus, unlike Tehran, is not a place filled with ideological hardliners, and certainly not with religious fanatics. Despite enhanced ideological rhetoric by Bashar al-Asad, particularly since the Iraq war, the pragmatism of the elder Asad has not necessarily been buried. Syria opened diplomatic relations with Iraq's new government, which many in Damascus see as a US puppet, faster than expected.
Since , Assad has repeatedly offered Israel direct peace negotiations. He has even abandoned his demand that Israel deliver on a promise murdered former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin once made to return almost the entire Golan Heights to Syria. There are potential openings that could be used to entice Syria to abandon the Hezbollah-Tehran axis:. This suggests that Syria might even be prepared to sign a peace treaty with Israel if the Israeli-Palestinian question had not yet been satisfactorily resolved.
Indeed, the Syrians would not permit Hamas to open an office in Damascus until a few years ago. The war in Iraq and the US's emergence as a common enemy have given secularists and Islamists a common denominator—but one that is not necessarily permanent.
Its current alliances are dictated by foreign policy constraints. If these constraints are set aside and Syria manages to find other allies, even its partnership with Iran and support of Hezbollah could crumble. Peaceful coexistence among various religious groups has a longer tradition in Syria than the Baath party, and the ruling Alevites see religious diversity as an important aspect of their legitimacy.
Having said this, the regime in Damascus has also played destructive roles in the region, especially since shortly before the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February Asad's personal fallout with Hariri in Damascus in September started the tragedy.
In an attempt to display political strength, Asad used harsh means to change the Lebanese constitution for the purpose of prolonging the term of pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud.
Hariri, who used to be a rather moderate and integrating politician, opposed this move and after his rough treatment by Bashar drifted toward the anti-Syrian camp in Lebanon.
Whoever was behind Hariri's murder, Asad has to take political responsibility for the fact that the political atmosphere escalated and hate campaigns against Hariri were on the march. Asad widely underestimated the international reaction after Hariri's assassination.
After he realized that military sanctions against his country were a real scenario, he finally announced the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which was completed before the international deadline in April With its military engagement, the Syrian regime had ended the civil war in Lebanon in , but in the new foreign policy environment pressure has been rising on Syria, especially by the United States and France, to grant Lebanon its full sovereignty and independence.
After this humiliating experience, the Syrian regime has reacted like a snubbed child. In his speech in front of the Parliament when he announced the Syrian withdrawal, Asad missed the opportunity to reconcile the Lebanese people who celebrated their independence.
Ayman Abdul Nour, once a friend from Asad's youth and a Baath member with a critical voice, said in frustration that "Bashar's speech was a golden opportunity to address the Lebanese people, especially the younger population. Since then Syria has tried to keep up its influence in Lebanon with political allies such as Hezbollah and the influence of a mysterious web of Syrian intelligence.
Murders of anti-Syrian intellectuals and politicians have followed, although it has never been clearly established if they were ordered from high up the Syrian command chain, if low-level Syrian and Lebanese officials played their complex game of interests, or if it was even Israeli operations that intended to blackmail Syria during this sensitive period, as many Syrians claim.
After the Hariri assassination the Lebanon issue has become a red rag for the regime. A sense of panic and helplessness seems to be in the air in Damascus.
Syria has been reluctant to recognize Lebanese sovereignty, to demarcate mutual borders, or to come to friendly terms with the government in Beirut. Syria brought stability to Lebanon, but Syria could also break it again. Instead of playing a conciliatory and stabilizing role in the neighboring democracy, the regime has arrested well-known intellectuals of the oppositional secular Civil Society Movement in Syria who signed a declaration in favour of normal relations with the Lebanese neighbor.
Journalist Michel Kilo, human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bounni, and other intellectuals from Syria were jailed in May because they had drafted the Damascus-Beirut Declaration together with Lebanese counterparts.
Thus they crossed the red line. Aggravating the situation was the fact that the petition appeared on the eve of a UN Resolution draft put forward by the US, France, and Britain in the Security Council. Resolution stipulates the necessity to take measures to prevent the entry of Syrian arms into Lebanon, the demarcation of the border between Lebanon and Syria, and the exchange of ambassadors. The regime may have inferred—or looked for a pretext to infer—that the signatories of the Damascus-Beirut Declaration have lined up with the foreign powers in this matter.
But those who know Kilo and most of the other intellectuals will agree that this is a highly constructed nexus. In this way the regime has further estranged moderate secular forces that are Syrian patriots and potential allies. Kilo, for example, tried to push for a technocratic solution that would lead into a more pluralist political system.
He, like many others, has repeatedly distanced himself from US attempts to establish democracy in the Middle East by forced and ill-considered regime change and refused any form of cooperation with US-supported opposition figures. Kilo is at least as pan-Arab as the Baathists. His arrest symbolizes the short-sighted decisions taken by the regime in recent months.
Asad has not only gambled away the goodwill of many moderate opposition figures but he has also lost leeway in pursuing foreign policy strategies of his own. The President is lacking vision and strategic sensitiveness. He is riding on a wave of popular support, thanks to ill-conceived US foreign policy and his increased pan-Arab rhetoric.
He has taken up his role as the "defender of Arab interests" when he opposed the Anglo-American invasion in Iraq as strongly as no other Arab leader, although Saddam Hussein for many years counted as one of the staunchest enemies of Bashar's father Hafez al-Asad.
Whereas his father never really depended on domestic public opinion, Asad started to ride on popular support and even took along Islamists as well as parts of the moderate opposition who share the common denominator of Anti-Americanism.
In lack of other successes that he could present the Syrian public—such as economic progress, including the long overdue association agreement with the European Union, or political glasnost—he has become one-dimensionally dependent on this form of populism. The drawbacks of Asad's reliance on populism have become obvious during his first public speech after the cease fire between Hezbollah and Israel in August , after which German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier cancelled his planned visit to Damascus.
It was expected that Asad congratulated Hezbollah for its "victory" against the Israeli army. But Asad went over the board when he declared that peace with Israel was impossible and resistance was the only answer. He spoke to a domestic audience in the first place. But neglecting international ramifications shows a lack of political instinct.
Moreover, with this speech Asad contradicted his own policy. Newer Syrian school books mention the Madrid Peace Process and describe a fair peace with Israel as a "strategic choice of Syria. Until the end of he never got a constructive response from Tel Aviv. Israel has had no reason to take Asad seriously as long as Syria is being softened up by the United States. Time has been on Israel's side since Syria's position has become weaker. Meanwhile, Asad has qualified his heated remarks from August in media interviews.
In the German magazine Der Spiegel, he said: "I am interested in negotiations and achieving peace with Israel" and "The result of this victory [of Hezbollah against Israel] is the hope of conducting negotiations with Israel. The price that Syria demands is clear: most parts of the Golan Heights.
Asad cannot afford more foreign policy disasters or even renounce Syria's claim on the Golan after the withdrawal from Lebanon. Quietly, he has already ceded the Antakya province to Turkey which has been officially regarded as Syrian territory since the French colonial administration decided to cede it to Turkey in With this pragmatic move, Asad has contributed to rekindle relations with its northern neighbor since after both countries had been at the brink of war in the late s.
Lebanon will always remain crucial for Syria. This is less for catering pan- Arab rhetoric that Lebanon be part of a greater Syrian nation.
The reasons why Lebanon is important are more of practical nature. Lebanon means strategic depths for Syria. When the Israeli army invaded Lebanon in the early s, they swiftly stood some 20 kilometers away from Damascus. Furthermore, Lebanon has always been the cultural and economic window to the world as much as Hong Kong has been for China.
Legal and illegal trade is nurturing Syria's closed economy. Lebanon has also been a backyard for experiments of free speech. Syrian opposition figures could publish their criticism freely in the Lebanese press.
Even if newspapers of a particularly day might have been banned in Damascus, the message always reached the ones in power. Finally, Syria is afraid that Israel tries once again to win over the Lebanese government as an ally like it attempted during the civil war. Therefore, the West should consider it as a legitimate interest of Syria to have close relations with Lebanon.
In turn, the West can demand from Syria that it stops manipulating Lebanese domestic politics and that it recognizes Lebanon as an independent and sovereign state.
A further demand could be that the regime in Damascus grant citizenship to the rest of its Kurdish community. On top of Asad's agenda stands—apart from negotiations about the Golan— a face saving way out of the investigations on Hariri's assassination. Whoever will be proven culpable by the UN investigation led by Detlev Mehlis and then Serge Brammertz, this incident changed the political game board and atmosphere in Damascus.
Asad has hard decisions ahead of him. He may soon face the choice between covering up close family members against allegations of murder and thus isolating Syria even further or handing them over to the international community as real culprits or scapegoats. Both alternatives will put his political—and maybe personal—survival at stake. In oppositional circles in Damascus, Asad is being described as nervous and as a president who hardly leaves his office any more. This implies the danger of an increasing loss of reality and autism.
Further consequences of this back-to-the-wall dilemma are fatalistic scenarios like heated war rhetoric from Damascus with regard to a forceful liberation of the Golan Heights, and the forging of dangerous alliances with Islamists abroad.
In order to regain strength and independence from his corrupt extended family clan, Asad needs successes in the foreign policy arena. As already mentioned above, one of these could be the ratification of the long-planned free trade agreement with the European Union. This would boost reformers in the government and benefit the Syrian economy.
The EU Parliament has already followed this path and argued for the agreement to be enacted soon. Otherwise, Syria will continue to strengthen links with or look for new partners like Iran, Russia or even Venezuela.
Anti-Americanism has become the common denominator and driving force of pragmatic extended alliances. Opposition against the Baath regime and democratic options. If one holds the opinion that Asad, in his deep conviction, is still a reformer as he was in , then it would make sense to strengthen his position and to involve his reformers in government. At the moment, there are not many alternatives besides him.
The domestic opposition is silenced and has not produced a charismatic leader. On the other side, more radical Syrian opposition figures have formed alliances abroad and work against the regime from Paris, London and Washington. Others like the Washington-backed neo-conservative Farid al-Ghadry have no sympathy within Syria and have hardly lived there.
They or some of their followers may become dangerous for the Baathists but none of them would be a solution for Syria and a promising actor for democratic change. Far too little attention has been paid by the West and particularly the US to Syria's secular opposition who are embedded in Syrian society and history of thought or Syria's moderate Muslim activists who are members of parliament, entrepreneurs or scholars.
The latter take Turkey as their model, and some of them carry the wish to found a political party that would resemble the moderate Islamist AKP. Both secularists, moderate Islamists and even the chastened Muslim Brothers in London have taken steps toward "national reconciliation" by signing common documents such as the Damascus Declaration in October However, ideological and personal rivalries have increased in recent months.
The domestic opposition strongly opposes any collaboration with Al-Ghadry in Washington and with Khaddam in Paris who had been largely responsible for blocking many of Asad's reform endeavors and for oppressing the reform movement during the Damascus Spring Syria's opposition would benefit from a reduced pressure on Syria. If the regime gets air to breathe and is accepted again as an equal partner in the Middle East peace efforts, Asad may feel comfortable again to pick up the loose ends and embark on more sweeping reforms.
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